ABSTRACT
Introduction As US President Barack Obama approached the midpoint of his second term in office, the political atmosphere for Russo-American nuclear arms reductions was fraught and seemingly unfavorable for meaningful progress. Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent destabilization of eastern Ukraine capped the Obama “reset” in US-Russian relations and created a palpable feeling of distrust between NATO and Russia.1 In addition, Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly introduced the threat of nuclear escalation into the crisis in Ukraine. As Russian troops and military equipment continued to flow into eastern Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists there, Putin issued a public warning in late August 2014: “I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations,” and added that “this is a reality, not just words.”2 Putin also indicated that Russia was strengthening its nuclear deterrent forces and noted that “it’s best not to mess with us” over Ukraine.3 In midSeptember 2014 Putin warned that Russia would counter military moves by the United States and NATO with nuclear and conventional force modernization.4 Earlier in the same month, a Russian general and senior Defense Ministry official called for Russia to revise its military doctrine and specify conditions under which Russia might launch a preemptive nuclear strike against NATO.5
