ABSTRACT
The Roman motto, of si vis pacem, para bellum (if you wish for peace, prepare for war) highlights one early state’s use of military threats to coerce another nation’s behavior.1 Not only states but individuals as well use the concept of deterrence on a daily basis. Almost every parent engages in the full spectrum of deterrence at some point when raising their children via rewards and threats to coerce desired behavior or prohibit undesired behavior. With the detonation of two atomic bombs over Japan in August 1945, and the Soviet Union testing an atomic bomb in 1949, the academic field of nuclear deterrence began. Within the new field two theorists gained early prominence; Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn developed different analytical frameworks regarding rational adversary behavior during the Cold War.2 Schelling proposed a stable balance of terror focused on mutually assured destruction emphasizing the element of chance.3 Kahn emphasized an asymmetric balance of terror in favor of the United States and accompanied by defensive efforts.4 Both theories focused on the ability of rational actors to deduce the inner workings of deterrence. While the overall concept of deterrence appears straightforward, according to the Department of Defense definition of manipulating behavior via threats, the actual process of deterrence involves highly complex, mental mechanisms and a variety of situational factors. The salient point for both theories concerns their development during a time when the dominant feature of the international strategic environment was a bipolar adversarial relationship between the nuclear-armed countries of the United States and the Soviet Union. The current strategic environment is no longer congruent with bipolarity. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet-American, adversarial relationship dissolved. The strategic environment that emerged looks markedly different and more complex with nine nuclear weapon states in addition to rogue states and violent non-state actors exploiting the proliferation of weapon technology.5 To properly elucidate the growth in complexity, Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 are approximate depictions of the nuclear environment during the Cold War and today.
