ABSTRACT

This chapter will trace dimensions of power and money in the Mumbai municipal (or ‘local’) elections held in February 2012. I will try to uncover the sources of all the money circulating before the elections, starting from the assumption that many corporators are supported by private-sector firms. This, in turn would provide more evidence that we can speak of a ‘political machine’ in terms of J. C. Scott (1969) where business elites finance politicians in return for (later) support. And if we find such a ‘financial corporator-business nexus’, a relevant question is what this means for local democracy, accountability and the scope for adequate long-term policy making. But, true to this book’s benchmark, this chapter wants to also appraise the reasons for poor slum people to vote for this or that candidate. How to explain their political behaviour? What does it say about the way they see democracy, and whether it actually helps them in their quest for livelihoods and upward mobility? The study is framed in already introduced patronage democracy and mediated state perspectives, but I will review a few perspectives pertaining to micro – in this case booth-level election/voting aspects here, such as the notion of the vote bank and the presumed efficacy of providing cash for votes. I suggest that voters can sometimes be punished for voting a certain, ‘wrong’ way, conceptualised as ‘perverse accountability’ (Stokes 2005).