ABSTRACT
This chapter presents allows for some sloppiness regarding certain distinctions: between beliefs, propositions, and judgments; between knowledge, justification, and reasonable assertability; and between general propositions. It is a principle of common sense that those things which people perceive distinctly in their immediate environment do really exist and are, more or less, what they take them to be. There is no call for reason or argument. Reid is correct that judgements about the objective reality of things are instinct-like effects of the understanding, of which no further ground can be given. He's right that they are properly basic. Tetens's presentation is a flop: the writing is awful; the arguments are flimsy. He spins his wheels and never gets going. But the middle road he wants to take is the right one. Reid requires less for justification and Kant requires more. Extremes are often untenable. But Tetens stumbled on the better view with the weaker strain of externalism.
