ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) in Sweden. The chapter starts out by describing the developments that led up to the positioning of Swedish banks at the outset of the crisis, for example, how the experiences from a domestic financial crisis in the 1990s contributed to having capital adequacy levels well above the Basel I minimum requirements. In parallel, the chapter also describes the development of the Swedish accounting regime over time, and the low level of prior experience with fair value accounting at the outset of the GFC. The chapter points at three main effects on the banks during the GFC: (1) the support Swedish banks received from Swedish authorities, and what role the banks’ high capital levels played in this context; (2) the accounting for credit losses during the GFC, applying the incurred loss model, in comparison with how credit losses were accounted for during 1990s crisis when an expected loss approach was used; and (3) failed application of fair value accounting in two smaller Swedish banks with trading portfolios and what we can learn from these two cases. The chapter closes with some observations regarding effects of the GFC in Sweden after the crisis.
