ABSTRACT

The war on terrorism has remained open-ended in time, geography, and resources—including money, talent, and preemptive lethal force. Lacking a strong framework for strategy and war termination, the United States replaced the actual threat of al-Qaeda with the possibility of al-Qaeda (or "associates") in a widening range of places. One unfortunate result of letting tactics take such a prominent role is that political leaders become unhealthily involved in the details and lose perspective as to the strategic purpose of the war. With smaller ongoing US operations from the Philippines to the Horn of Africa, a sustainable strategy must also weigh means and ends in the ongoing war against al-Qaeda. Through the post-9/11 years, the United States evolved in its answer to al-Qaeda, from major combat operations, counterinsurgency and nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, toward juxtaposing the decline of al-Qaeda with the rise of aggressive US special operations and paramilitary intelligence activity globally.