ABSTRACT
The European Union’s (EU) future has been put into question in practice as well as in theory (Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015; Schmitter 2012; Vollard 2008). In a purely probabilistic sense, the fact that the EU shows signs of disintegration is hardly surprising since most of the many efforts at transnational regional integration since World War II have exhibited similar symptoms. Either they failed to fulfill their initial commitments, withdrew from tasks already assigned to them or simply collapsed altogether. That so many observers of the EU regarded it as exceptional and, hence, immune to disintegration perhaps explains the apparent surprise among observers. Of course, so far all that has been observed are “morbidity symptoms,” not some definitive diminution or demise. Nevertheless, the events and processes triggered by the dual crises of the euro and the EU do require some re-thinking about the theories (and their presumptions) that have been used to explain the heretofore relative success of regional integration in Europe (for a critical discussion, see Vollard 2008). Prominent among these has been the neo-functionalist approach. The temptation, therefore, would seem to be to call into question its basic assumption, namely the predominant role played by a diversity of self-interested actors competing with each other for the functional distribution of public goods provided by regional institutions. This could then be replaced by another approach, probably some version of inter-governmentalism in which the only relevant actors are states promoting their self-regarding national interests and protecting their citizens from foreign intromission into their affairs and values.2 In this chapter it is our purpose not to reject but to exploit neo-functionalism as a conceptual and theoretical instrument that helps understand the current crisis and its future consequences. It does not deny that the formal institutions and informal practices of the EU are threatened or that previously unobserved tendencies have emerged, but seeks to interpret them in ways that are consistent with its basic assumptions. As an approach to understanding transnational regional integration, neofunctionalism has been frequently criticized for its alleged bias in favor of such a process – despite explicit protestations to the contrary by one of its practitioners (Schmitter 2004). The confusion seems due to the fact that the conditions present
in Western Europe were unusually favorable to the generation/cultivation of spill-overs from one functional arena to another and from lower to higher levels of common authority. When the approach was applied elsewhere to efforts at regional integration in less favorable settings, it (correctly) predicted failure even to meet the objectives proclaimed in their founding treaties (Haas and Schmitter 1964; Schmitter 1970). The normal expectation with regard to the performance of such regional or global efforts at functional cooperation/integration is that they should “selfencapsulate,” i.e., at best they should perform the initial tasks bestowed upon them by member states (MSs) by international agreement and then persist as stable institutionalized components of the interstate order. Only in exceptional circumstances or conditions should actors within such arrangements be expected to agree to a redefinition of their functional tasks or an upgrading of their authoritative status. Given the current and concurrent crises of the EU and the euro, it would seem appropriate to explore the hypotheses and presumptions that neo-functionalism might employ to predict “spill-backs” rather than “spill-overs.” A spill-back is when MSs no longer wish to deal with a policy at the supra-national level, e.g., the collapse of the euro or MS exits from the eurozone or even the EU – be they coerced (e.g., Grexit) or voluntary (e.g., Brexit). Such “spill-backs” are fervently advocated by parties on the radical Left and Right (albeit for different reasons) in both debtor and creditor states (e.g., Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, French Front National, Communist Party of Greece). In this piece we apply neofunctionalist theory in an effort to understand the causal logic of disintegration, and its likely point of departure. When and why should one expect that a given set of institutions of regional integration would agree (or be forced) to withdraw their competence to make policy in an arena previously subject to its transnational “governance”? Or, more dramatically, under what condition might it collapse altogether? The EU is not likely to break as long as it successfully fulfills key functions for the Union’s economy and society as a whole; but it can and will break if it does not. In what follows, we first articulate explicit (and implicit) neo-functionalist suppositions and hypotheses. Next, we try to identify whether and to what extent disintegration is indeed a possibility in the empirical world. To this end, we examine different pieces of empirical evidence in favor or against neo-functionalist expectations; we either employ official databases (e.g., Eurostat, Eurobarometer) or rely on existing analyses. Instead of conclusion, we close with the most recent development, the Greek referendum of July 2015, when politicization and conflict reached its zenith.
