ABSTRACT
Assuming that all governments want to remain in power, and act accordingly to do so, this chapter starts with the presumption that national governments in a post-constitutional era use their power to develop systems of local governments that are favorable to their rule. In most constitutions that have been adopted the last few decades, there are provisions for elected local governments, but the process of implementing them is easily manipulated as local governments are always subordinate to the national governments. In this chapter, we identify four strategies for manipulating political decentralisation. These four strategies are: 1) creating institutional gaps; 2) national dominance; 3) overwhelming the opposition; and 4) regionalised opposition enclaves. While the first of these strategies manipulates the process to such an extent that the process of political decentralization must be identified as flawed, the last three strategies are ways to strengthen the position of already strong national governments. These four strategies of manipulation all reduce the challenges that occur for the power-seeking national government when arenas for contestation and participation are attempted and multiplied by establishing elected subnational governments. Considering these calculations, the introduction of decentralisation reforms is not necessarily donor-driven or incompatible with authoritarianism but can be a result of endogenous motivations across regime type.
