ABSTRACT
I HAVE entitled this chapter ‘Functionalism’, not because I think th a t all those psychologists whom I wish to discuss would be willing to answer to th a t title, but because I think th a t it is a convenient way of indicating what is common to them. (Koffka once claimed th a t Gestalt Psychology had something in common with functionalism (see Ellis, op. cit., page 377), but this is not so in the sense in which I shall use the term.) The psychologists so far considered have tended to treat perception as a more or less passive affair. Those whom I wish to consider now are more inclined to treat it as a mental function, and thus take a more active view of it. They have also tended to stress the role played by learning in the determination of what we see. Indeed, within the general movement, there has been an emphasis upon the heterogeneity of the factors determining how we see things, including reference to the part played by needs and motives. Psychoanalysis has had its influence here in forming what has been called the ‘new look’ approach to perception. I t is only necessary to mention the work carried out by Bruner and others in this respect (see, for example, Blake and Ramsey, op. cit., and Vernon, op. cit.,
Chapter 10). Those whom I have selected for consideration (and I might, perhaps, have selected others) are theoretically interesting, and reveal also the philosophical dangers involved in this approach to perception, in which it is considered that in perceiving we are doing something. Such a view, as I hope to show, covers an im portant tru th , but it is also liable to lead to paradox. In general, functionalism can be considered as a reaction against Gestalt Theory.
