ABSTRACT
To review progress so far, we have seen that the distinction between being and happening can be applied to mental occurrences just as to the physical world. The causation of mental happenings and of behaviour is basically conceptualised in terms of powers and liabilities and the generative relation, just as for other types of physical causation. In the case of mental occurrences and behaviour, however, there are two fundamentally different ways in which things are made to happen, in the psychological construction of the mind. One way resembles our understanding of physical causation in being the essentially deterministic interplay of powers, releasing conditions, and liabilities. In the other way, «I» is the sole cause of mental occurrences and behaviour: in producing such things, it is up to «I» what to do, meaning that «I» always has the capacity to do other than what <<I» does, and «I» is also conceived as a causal origin. What <<I» can do is limited by the powers possessed by the person. Such doings are understood as conscious and intentional, and explained in terms of reasons.
