ABSTRACT

If microphysical neural reductionism gets things right, conscious properties inherit all their causal powers from the microphysical properties of certain neural assemblies and so are totally realized by those microphysical neural properties. A strategy for showing that conscious properties inherit all their causal powers from microphysical neural properties is the following. First, include subjective perspectivity, qualitative character and intentionality in the set of representational properties. Second, include representational properties in the set of functional properties. Third, survey enough of the neuropsychological, neuroimaging and evolutionary evidence to convince doubters that the neural correlates of such functionalized conscious properties are also neural substrates for them. Fourth, invoke a thesis such as (NR) 1 to warrant reducing those functionalized properties to certain microphysical properties of neural substrates. Successfully completing these steps provides a blueprint for the kind of arguments for any candidate conscious property to reduce to the microphysical properties of neural assemblies.