ABSTRACT
Electoral systems can be designed to facilitate or impede incumbent reelection. When easy reelection is impeded, concern with public preferences among officeholders might increase. Length of term may affect the visibility and public memory of past decisions. Size of constituency can also affect policy outcomes. The public feels that offices representing larger numbers of people are important than offices representing smaller aggregates. Issues that mobilize the public or are perceived as mobilizing can provide decision makers with another incentive to produce policies that the public prefers. One rationale for regulation has been to balance financial requirements of public utilities with the needs of the public for affordable, nondiscriminatory access. Policy makers and reformers should be cautioned when offering electoral reforms in the hope of promoting public preferences over special-interest preferences. Bureaucratic resources have a two-pronged impact on policy production. Resources enhance the bureaucracy’s ability to monitor and discern public preferences, while also providing greater influence over the actual implementation process.
