ABSTRACT
Chapter 3 presents a predominately quantitative overview of the UK public debate prior to the invasion of Iraq, derived from a large-scale content analysis exercise showing the pattern of public attitudes across the different sources comprising the holistic approach. It highlights three factors that help us understand how it was possible that concerted public opposition failed to stop Britain joining the Iraq war. To begin with, although opinion polls, press commentary and parliamentary speeches showed consistent opposition to the prospect of war throughout the pre-invasion period, the Blair government accurately predicted a ‘rally ’round the flag’ effect once battle commenced. Secondly, ministers enjoyed significant pockets of support in public debate, including politically pivotal forces such as Rupert Murdoch’s media empire and the opposition Conservative Party. Both supported military action against Saddam Hussein more vociferously even than Tony Blair himself. Finally, official communication efforts largely worked, at least in the short term. While they may not have changed many minds, the government’s contributions to public debate successfully lowered the salience of Iraq as an issue. In effect, they reduced the intensity without changing the direction of public opposition, and that proved sufficient. Through setting out these points, this chapter further highlights key ‘moments’ in the debate that prove significant in Part II.
