ABSTRACT
Chapter 5 recounts the Blair government’s attempt to frame military action in Iraq as a necessary response to the threat posed by Iraq’s alleged development of banned Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The claim that Iraq represented a security threat to Britain should have strengthened the invasion’s legitimacy while also raising both public interest in and public approval of the prospect of military action. That it did not do so reflected three major shortcomings in the way the government made its case. First, officials and ministers misjudged the danger Iraq actually posed, a point underlined after the invasion by the absence of WMD. Second, this exaggeration damaged the government’s credibility. The now-notorious ‘dossier’ published in September 2002 failed to disclose how much the case for confronting Iraq depended on a changed ‘calculus of threat’ in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, rather than new evidence. It did not reflect the uncertainty underpinning JIC judgments, and placed too much weight on too little knowledge. Finally, the government exploited the information advantage it enjoyed over other participants in public debate in order to push its preferred policy line. At the same time, it claimed it sought a well-informed public debate, and presented political judgments as neutral facts. This was problematic in terms of its normative claim to legitimacy.
