ABSTRACT
Despite the enthusiasm behind the security-development nexus, it has also received significant criticism. Critics argue that rather than an integrated approach, the nexus results in the securitisation of development, where development is employed to further desired security outcomes. While the implementation of the security-development nexus appears to support these arguments, the critiques focus on the outcomes of the security-development nexus with little understanding of what contributes to these outcomes. This book seeks to address this gap to determine why the security-development nexus does not achieve the expectations attached to it. As critics focus on the dominance of security in the nexus, this book contends that the problem lies in the integration of security and development. As such, it investigates what in practice inhibits the integration of security and development into a nexus. In contrast to the examination of outcomes in the literature on the securitisation of development, the focus here is on processes, investigating how security and development are integrated into a nexus, and what limitations exist. To do this, the book hypothesises and investigates four tensions that influence the integration of security and development. These tensions are analysed by examining how the security-development nexus is implemented in two case studies of internationally driven initiatives to address organised crime: Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia).
