ABSTRACT
An important question that should be answered by any theory of consciousness is: What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? In the previous chapter we examined several theories including some that attempt to reduce consciousness to neural states. The primary focus of this chapter will be on “representational theories of consciousness” which attempt to reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural or other physical states. This approach has been quite popular over the past few decades. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states, and higher-order representationalism (HOR) which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is that a HOR is directed at M. In addition, so-called “self-representationalism” is also critically discussed in this chapter. As we shall see, there are some similarities between HOR and self-representationalism. Two other cognitive theories of consciousness,
Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts theory and Bernard Baars’ global workspace theory, are also introduced in this chapter.
