ABSTRACT
One of the most helpful clarifications of human rights is Isaiah Berlin's famous "two concepts of liberty". "Negative liberty" consists in the "freedom from" external coercion: the absence of a wall separating East and West Berlin permits individuals to enter West Berlin. "Positive liberty" consists in "freedom for": access to motorized transport enables one to travel from Leipzig to Berlin. Grotius' concept of negative and positive liberty is grounded in his dual framework of justice, which in fact develops the classical taxonomy of Aristotle and Aquinas. He offers both intrinsic and extrinsic justifications for natural Right by outlining a conception of human nature. The metaethical debate between naturalism and voluntarism has persisted since Plato formulated its dilemma in the Euthyphro: does God command actions because they are good, or do actions become good because God commands them? Grotius first implicitly divides Right into categories of divine positive Right and natural Right.
