ABSTRACT

I IThasbeenregardedastheproperconcernofaphilosopher toexplain,criticizeorevenjustifymoralstandardsandthe judgmentsthataremadeinaccordancewithsuchstandards. Theworkofmoralphilosophersinthepasthascommonlyhad apracticalaim.Theyexpectedthattheirenquiriesintothe natureofmoraljudgmentswouldenableustoanswerthe question'Whatistherightwaytolive?'withgreaterandmore justifiedassurancethanwedidbefore.Atthepresenttime, moralphilosophersareverymuchmorecautiousinmaking claimsofthiskindandinarousingsuchexpectationsintheir readers.Therearegoodreasonsfortheirdiffidence.One practicalreason,aswehaveseen,isthatnoneoftheattempts oftheirpredecessorshasbeensuccessfulincommandingmore thanaverylimitedassentandthattheyhaveallprovedvulnerabletocriticism.Butthereisanevenbetterreasonofa theoreticalkindfordistrustingtheclaimsofphilosopherstobe abletoprovidemoralguidance.Wecannowsee,inthelightof theworkofpreviousphilosophers,thatitislogicallyabsurdto supposethatapracticalconclusionaboutwhatwearemorally obligedtodocouldeverbedemonstrated.Ishallreturntothis pointlater.