ABSTRACT
We have traced so far the failure oftwo distinct models of inquiry to explain human action in both a general societal and a specifically curricular fonn. Both models were fonnally comparable in that both assumed classical as well as revisionist fonns. In the first place, there was the model of classical empiricism that underwent, first, a causal behavioural and then a non-causal 'operant' refonnulation. In the second place, there was the model constituted first by classical Marxism and subsequently undergoing phenomenological revision. In the final analysis, our quest for an irreducibly rule-following explanation of human understanding and its issue in speech-acts has to do with reality-defining processes that are constitutive of man's mind. We have not yet here fully extended the thesis of our previous book, that reality-defining processes assume a limited number of distinct fonns, in a way which we hope to do later in Chapter 8. But what we have so far established is the dependence of a rule-following model on some account of reality processing in which propositions in language come to be true or false. We saw this in particular when we analysed in detail the two fonns taken by a Marxist model of explanation. The epistemological foundations of both fonns we saw to be unstable because ofa defective epistemology that had produced deep-seated errors. How the notion of subconscious or 'implicit' knowledge of the rules for processing reality is to be justified we shall try to answer when we develop the theoretical strands of our argument further later in this work.
