ABSTRACT
We saw earlier (Chapter 8) that Hamlyn set the later Wittgenstein against Chomsky on the grounds that Wittgenstein's notion of language-games defines objectivity in terms of an interpersonal backcloth of human judgements that removes the necessity for postulating innate, universal semantic structures. Whether this is true to what the later Wittgenstein intended or not is a question for those concerned with the history of ideas. Although such an interpretation might appear to be supported by some of Wittgenstein's remarks (for example, 1969, p. 90, discussed above, pp. 301-2), we have argued that such an interpretation runs contrary to other of his insights, particularly those embodied in his doctrine of family-resemblance, which stresses the basic continuity of human judgements (above, pp. 73-85, 119-25,277-82). OUf use of this doctrine in connection with Wittgenstein's notion of objectivity is to claim that the doctrine points to certain irreformable characteristics of human languages and the fundamental key to their translatability. If our understanding of this basic insight has therefore been valid, Hamlyn's position in regarding Wittgenstein and Chomsky as necessarily at variance is without foundation.
