ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the validity and scope of the appeal to ordinary language from standard examples. The argument from standard examples is a technique of refutation: it attacks statements made by philosophers by means of the contention, not that these statements are false or unproved, but that they are without sense. The practice of many contemporary philosophers implies that, in their view, the scrutiny of ordinary language is a large part, if not the whole, of what philosophers should be doing when they discuss perception and the knowledge of the external world. The 'lack of originality' shows itself in the failure to 'break the deadlock between Locke and Berkeley': 'philosophers were found, well into the present century, discussing perception as if the only possibilities were versions of Locke's position, or of Berkeley's'. It examines Mr Warnock's own interesting attempt to 'break the deadlock between Locke and Berkeley' and an argument developed by Professor Ryle in his recently published Tarner Lectures.
