ABSTRACT

The chapter examines seriatim the arguments by which Professor Ryle thinks he has got rid of dualism. It discusses certain general arguments and then considers his attack on specific alleged mental phenomena. Professor Ryle uses the old argument that introspection would involve attending to two things at once, but admits that this is not conclusive in itself, though he thinks it would suffice to make many people doubtful whether they did introspect. Coming from Professor Ryle, this is a peculiar argument, because he would hardly claim to know a priori. Professor Ryle has recourse to the infinite regress argument both against the notion of introspection as a separate cognitive operation or act of attention and against the notion of a self-consciousness supposed to be inherent in every mental state or process. Professor Ryle has a similar infinite regress argument against the concept of volition. He asks whether volitions are themselves voluntary or involuntary.