ABSTRACT
Introduction The debate about nuclear disarmament is plagued by the hegemony of existing mentalities. Opponents as well as many proponents of a nuclear-weapons-free world face difficulties in liberating themselves from the traditional thinking about national security, notably with regard to deterrence. Nuclearism has become so much a part of everyday thinking on security that breaking out of this frame faces formidable barriers, not least the inability of many pundits to ‘think out of the box’. Deterrence remains the sturdy child of the nuclear era. Acceptance of deterrence as the mainstay of nuclear security tends to lead people back to the assumptions and remedies that were elaborated for the nuclear age, overlooking possible alternative paths to national security that are more compatible with a world without nuclear weapons. The main point of a nuclear-weapons-free world (NWFW) is to leave the nuclear age behind, for good. On the road to this new and highly desirable state of affairs, many fallacies of the nuclear age must be discarded. To start with the worst one: ‘nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented’. This statement, put forwards in good faith many times over by nuclear proponents in the debate, totally ignores the myriad things that were once thought necessary, that ‘could not be disinvented’ – from slavery through DDT to CFCs. Again and again in history, the impossibility of disinventing eventually failed to impress political decision-makers who had become determined to get rid of something they had come to recognize as undesirable. And so they invested the effort and political capital necessary to create normative and institutional contexts that could make bans both possible and effective. I do not pretend that this will be easy to achieve concerning nuclear weapons – nor do I feel sure it will be eventually done. However, allegations of impossibility are simply unfounded. Nuclear weapons are the creation of humans: a social construct that can also be deconstructed. And, given the increasing dangers of a nuclear-armed world, we should certainly try. This chapter marks a serious attempt at thinking out of the box. First, I address the issue of deterrence and its role in the security system of an NWFW. Next, I examine why virtual deterrence, a popular solution for security in such a
world, contradicts the very principles on which such a world will have to be founded. I then turn to five elements that could help make that world stable. The first is embedded in the transformative character of the disarmament process itself. The second is an institutional innovation, a concert of major powers. The third is conventional deterrence against breakout and the institutional arrangements on which it is based. The fourth – optional – is collective (rather than national) missile defence. And the fifth is the creation of a true nuclear taboo, and not merely a metaphorical one.
