ABSTRACT

A necessary starting point for any book dealing with the topic of a theory of word meaning is the attack mounted by Quine against the very possibility of such a theory, at least in any scientifically respectable form.1 Quine's arguments are persuasive and his pessimistic view continues to be extremely influential among philosophers of language (for example, Davidson 1973, 1974a; Putnam 1978), and some linguists (Sampson 1980), though, as we might expect, not among all (Katz 1975; Chomsky 1976, 1980). Although many linguists are tempted to follow Katz in regarding Quine's objections as merely the legacy of a discredited behaviourism, it seems to me that he cannot be written off quite so easily, and that we can learn something quite important by taking his objections seriously and attempting to answer them.