ABSTRACT
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)—consisting of aviation, air borne, radar, communications, and air defense (surface-to-air missile [SAM] and anti-aircraft artillery [AAA] units)—is the third largest air force in the world (after the United States and Russia), with over 4,500 combat aircraft in its inventory.1 According to a PLAAF official history, the air force has shot down 1,474 and damaged 2,344 aircraft of all types since 1949, including involvement in the “War to Resist America and Aid Korea,” in numerous engagements with Nationalist and U.S. aircraft over the Taiwan Strait, in the “War to Aid Vietnam and Resist U.S. Aggression,” and in the 1979 “self-defensive counterattack” against Vietnam. These figures, however, can be misleading since the majority of the shootdowns came via AAA and, later, SAM fire. The statistics are also highly dubious from a West ern point of view.2 Quite apart from these statistics, however, an important ques tion remains-just how relevant is the combat experience of the PLAAF to contemporary discussions of China’s growing military and economic capabilities, and to the future security environment in the Asia-Pacific region?
