ABSTRACT

This chapter explains the People's Liberation Army (PLA) amphibious operations through Chinese perspectives by examining the field general's experiences. The PLA launched major offensive campaigns attacking Nationalist-controlled islands along Chinas coast in the 1950s. In response to the rapidly escalating Communist threats in the Taiwan Strait, the Eisenhower administration, in accordance with its obligations under the 1954 American-Taiwan mutual defense treaty, reinforced US naval units in East Asia and directed US warships to assist the Nationalists with their defense. The military experts and historians in China are likely to agree that the young guards considered international crises new opportunities to fight the Guomindang in order to finish the Chinese civil war. Analysis of the PLA amphibious experience of the 1950s demonstrates a Chinese military paradox with some disturbing implications. There was a gap between the high command and its field generals, as well as a gap between Beijing's political considerations and military operations on the ground in Zhejiang and Fujian.