ABSTRACT
It is a necessary condition for political representation ‘that the actions of . . .
policy makers are supposed to be responsive to the wishes of the people’
(Powell 2004, p. 273). For representation to be democratic, responsiveness
must be accompanied by ‘institutionalized arrangements that reliably create
such connections’, most importantly and irreplaceably ‘the free and competitive
national election in which all citizens can participate equally’ (pp. 273-274).
Democratic parliaments are assemblies of winners of such competitive elections.
In their classic study of substantive representation in the US Congress, Miller and
Stokes (1963) identified two mechanisms to ensure the representatives’ respon-
siveness: (a) the electoral process itself, which gives constituents the possibility
to choose representatives who pledge policies in line with their own preferences;
and (b) between elections, the representatives’ actions in the legislature are con-
nected with constituents through the former’s perceptions of the preferences of
the latter (anticipating voter responses in the next election). Assuming that
members of Parliament (MPs) care about getting re-elected and voters care
about MPs’ responsiveness, MPs have incentives to communicate their policy
proposals and explain their legislative activities to voters; voters have incentives
to communicate their policy preferences to candidates. While Miller and Stokes
(1963) modelled constituent-deputy relations as a dyadic process of
representation between voters and representatives, European party democracies
require some theoretical and empirical adjustments to account for the role of pol-
itical parties as well.
