ABSTRACT
The definition of mechanical procedures in terms of general recur siveness or Turing computability in mathematical logic is generally regarded as of great importance. In the words of Godel:21
It seems to me that this importance is largely due to the fact that with this concept one has for the first time succeeded in giving an absolute definition of an interesting epistemological notion, i.e., one not depending on the formalism chosen. In all other cases treated previously, such as demonstrability or definability, one has been able to define them only relative to a given language, and for each individual language it is clear that the one thus obtained is not the one looked for. For the concept of computability, however, although it is merely a special kind of demonstrability or definability, the situation is different. By a kind of miracle, it is not necessary to distinguish orders, and the diagonal procedure does not lead outside the defined notion. This, I think, should encourage one to expect the same thing to be possible also in other cases (such as demonstrability or definability).
