ABSTRACT
The primary paradox of gambling is that gamblers gamble and lose. For habitual gamblers the loss is certain, though not continuous: once in a while they win, but never enough to stay ahead of the house. Why don't they stop? Some explanations that look obvious at frrst sight do, in fact, even complicate the paradox instead of resolving it. One of these explanations is that gamblers engage in gambling as an innocent pastime, and that the amusement is worth the investment. The truth is that gamblers do not generally consider amusement more important than winning (cf. Chapter 3). Another explanation is that gamblers like to lose. This could be true for a small and rather sick minority of people, not for the vast numbers that engage in gambling regularly. The study of motives presented in Chapter 3 also contradicts this explanation: blackjack players pay attention to the expected value of a gamble, and appreciate a positive increase. Hence the "like to lose" issue complicates the paradox: gamblers continue to gamble and to lose, even though they want to win, and hate losing. Another simplistic explanation is that gamblers hope to make up for their losses in one extremely lucky coup. This could definitely be true for people playing in lotteries or football pools, since a small investment in these gambles can, in principle, produce an enormous yield, independently of the gamblers' strategy. But the chosen strategies in casino games like roulette and blackjack exclude the option of winning large amounts. In the game of blackjack, players refuse to spend a little time in the acq uisition of essential skills. In roulette it was observed that players place their bets such that large deviations from the expected 2.7% loss are virtually impossible. The "hope" explanation adds again to the paradox: gamblers continue to gamble and to lose, they want to win and hate losing, but they prefer strategies that will never change their fate. I propose to abandon these
explanations, and to look at some deeper insights provided by the theoretical contexts, discussed in Chapter 1.
