chapter  6
The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951–1953
ByAdrian R. Lewis
Pages 373

General Curtis LeMay was confident that strategic bombing alone could have won the war in Korea, and saved thousands of American lives. He believed that the United States possessed the technology to dictate the course and conduct of the war, and that it was a waste of precious American lives to engage in an unnecessary ground war. LeMay also believed that it was a mistake to employ strategic airpower, a limited resource, in support of ground tactical operations. LeMay commanded SAC throughout most of the 1950s, and it was his belief that airpower was the decisive instrument for the conduct of war-all wars. Soviet airpower helped maintained the flow of men and material across the Yalu and into North Korea. Public opinion is formed, molded, and continuously reshaped by what people read, hear, and see. The Army and nation adopted new personnel policies to conduct the Korean War. Throughout the war the Army faced severe personnel problems.