ABSTRACT
In recent decades, economists have invaded political science, armed to the teeth with formal theoretical models and sophisticated econometric methods (see, e.g., Robinson 2006). Among the stormtroopers is the duo Daron A. Acemoglu and James Robinson. In a series of articles, Acemoglu and Robinson have demonstrated that much of the variation in economic prosperity in our time – the difference between developed countries and developing countries as well as differences within the latter category – must be attributed to the existence or absence of a specific kind of political institution – that is, institutions that limit the power of the authorities (see Acemoglu et al. 2001; 2002a; 2008). Such ‘constraints on the executive’ are conducive to economic growth because they provide a shield against legal arbitrariness – a shield that guarantees private property and thereby the willingness of ordinary citizens to take risks.
