ABSTRACT
Most theories of justice presuppose that there is a neutral position from which we can debate our political interests. It is from this neutral point of view that we can arrive at a common set of aims that ultimately informs our choice of a social contract. In Chapter 3, I argued against a neutral position. Instead, we have to consider the possibility that individuals have very diverse perspectives, and as such have difficulty finding any common ground from which to debate. The aim of this chapter is to develop a procedure for determining the set of rights afforded to individuals when those same individuals agree on very little. In fact, I will consider the case where people not only disagree about what their preferred outcomes are, but they also disagree about what the set of outcomes even looks like. We can think of this as the second of a three-stage process: first we had a determination of our agreement and disagreement in the view from everywhere, now we will explore multi-perspectival bargain for the determination of a contract, and then we will see the role for experiments within the confines of the contract.
