ABSTRACT
This introduction presents an overview of key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book argues that people shouldn't accept Michael Smith's brand of internalism and also argues against the competing view that their values are intrinsically practical and so-called besires. It shows that people can save the possibility of perversity by not conflating purposive and reasoned activity, and by recognizing how, as agents of reasoned activity, people are sometime lovers of the good and sometime mere lovers of success in action. The book presents the perennial issue of whether there are any values that reason itself forces on people within the reflective point of view. It focuses on a recent attempt by Christine Korsgaard to argue that this is indeed the case. Korsgaard takes her cue from Immanuel Kant's idea that willing evil implicates in a contradiction and violates an end that is inescapable or necessary within practical reflection.
