ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that people can appeal to their facility for considering certain questions in a way that renders them indistinguishable to make sense of the difference between purely first-person and observational self-knowledge. It discusses the questions of value provide us with a focus when we inquire, in a purely first-person way, into what we desire, will feel or are going to do, just as issues of truth provide us with a focus when we similarly inquire into what we believe. Purely first-person self-ascriptions of belief reflect this perspectival displacement: when we self-ascribe a belief that p in a purely first-person way, we also, and dominantly. In cases where people having purely first-personally self-attribute intentions, their transcendental way of relating to their own mental lives is double-aspected. The chapter focuses on the contrast between the practical and empirical perspectives in terms of decision and discovery of Richard Moran.
