ABSTRACT
A contributor to Forbes.com described Brazil and Russia as “the most similar of the BRIC countries: they are roughly comparable in size (143 million vs. 195 million)[,] they have reasonably high GDPs per capita, and their economies are extremely dependent on the export of natural resources” (Adomanis 2012). Rather more poetically, former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso felt that “Brasil é uma Rússia Tropical” (2001, 37), that Brazil was a “tropical Russia.” This somewhat stereotypical and diplomatic approach was doubled when the Russian consul in Rio, Vladimir Tyurdeneev, called his country a “polar Brasil” (Falando Russo 2012). The mutual stereotyping in order to foster bilateral relations is further shown in former President Cardoso’s idea that both countries were part of “Another West,” “uma espécie de Outro Ocidente” (Cardoso 2001, 37; Lafer 2000, 213) in that both their history and culture had been greatly influenced by the West, in each case in its own way, yet to lasting effects. Now, one may add, they likewise share an ambition, though with different motivations: both intend to be recognized as a major power in the international political arena. But while Russia longs to reassert itself and resume the place it held during the Cold War, its “tropical” counterpart wants to emancipate itself from the cliché membership to the US backyard club and affirm its position as Latin America’s leading power (Okouneva 2012, 13). In the sports world, they both have already succeeded in taking center stage, as they will be or already were hosts of mega-events, namely the Olympic Games in Sochi 2014 and Rio 2016 as well as the FIFA World Cup 2014 and 2018-the question remains to what extent they will be able to make each other advance in other arenas of international affairs.
