ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the objective limitations of the consent as a defence to the criminal harm-doing. Consent provides an objective justification for allowing a person to make choices that may involve consenting to harm, but consent is not absolute. Rational autonomy in the Kantian sense differs from personal autonomy, because it is an absolute. It is important to recognize that it is wrongful harm-doing that is criminalizable, not harm-doing per se. The Court was wrong to hold that informed consent would have been sufficient to provide the defendant in Konzani with a defence. The lawmaker is entitled to prevent people from harming and wronging others when the harm is exceptionally grave, but it is not entitled to criminalize self-harm. R. v. Brown involved a borderline dignity violation, as the harm was of a borderline kind. The harm to others justification for criminalization provides an important restraint, because suicide and self-harm also involve disrespect for dignity.
