ABSTRACT
This chapter examines some of the broader theoretical implications of the nuclear-cyber nexus for students of national security policy and warfare. It focuses on United States strategic nuclear deterrence and arms control with a net assessment. The chapter analyzes how the combination of nuclear and cyber attacks might at least hypothetically impact nuclear deterrence stability. It draws pertinent conclusions about the nuclear cyber interface insofar as it might pertain to future arms control, nonproliferation and deterrence. Cyber weapons should appeal to those who prefer a nonnuclear, or even a post-nuclear, military-technical arc of development. Nuclear weapons, whether held back for deterrence or fired in anger, must be incorporated into systems for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Thus the appeal of non-nuclear systems, including cyber weapons, for prospective attackers, rests in part on their putative capacity for mass disruption combined with precise lethality.
