ABSTRACT
Chapters 2 through 5 examined the structural, substantive, and procedural legitimacy of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Olympic Games. Chapter 3 suggested that one of the structural problems faced by the Games was a ‘problem of many hands’, with the IOC playing an oversight role, but not directly organising the Games. Chapter 4 discussed some of the problems associated with the Games, and how the less accountability that a state may have may increase the likelihood of these problems occurring. Chapter 5 focused on the host selection process, the only part of the Olympic Games under the direct and complete control of the IOC. The chapter found that accountability mechanisms were lacking, particularly in regard to public participation. Once the host is selected, the IOC delegates the organisation of the Games to other actors. This chapter will examine the organisation of the Games in detail, with a focus on the delegation by the IOC to other actors. Given that the IOC delegates most of the preparation for the Olympic Games to other actors, this chapter takes a principal-agent approach. Principal-agent approaches are increasingly being used to inform studies of accountability generally (Gailmard 2014, p. 90). In regards to global governance and global administrative law – the theoretical backgrounds of this research – administrative bodies, whether domestic or global, are often themselves agents to a legislative or executive body (the principals). In this context, principal-agent approaches have been used to examine administrative actors at both the domestic and the international level (for the international level, see Hawkins et al. 2006, p. 5; Elsig 2010; Nielson & Tierney 2003; for the domestic level see Calvert et al. 1989; McCubbins et al. 1987, for a global administrative law consideration, see Kingsbury 2009, p. 35). However, an administrative body may also itself act as a principal. As mentioned in Chapter 1, global governance bodies increasingly delegate their tasks to private actors (Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Weiss 1996 both cited in Murphy 2000, p. 795), creating a principal-agent relationship. As such, this chapter begins the move away from an analysis of the legitimacy of the IOC, to an examination of the accountability of the IOC
and those who organise the Olympic Games. In particular, this chapter focuses on the oversight and review by the IOC of the actions of those who organise the Games. In applying a principal-agent approach to examining the hosting of the Olympic Games, this chapter seeks to answer three questions. First, and this is a question addressed throughout this book, who should be held primarily accountable for the execution of the Games? Second, how does the IOC hold its agents accountable for their actions? Third, what substantive areas of human rights does the IOC set forth as mandates for its agents? This chapter will proceed in the following manner. Section 1 will outline the basics of the principal-agent approach, and how the approach may be applied to the Olympic Games. Section 2 will evaluate the various mechanisms the IOC uses to control those who put on the Olympic Games, namely the host selection process, the Host City Contract, the IOC’s Coordination Commission, and the Olympic Games Impact reports. Section 3 will address a major critique of the principal-agent approach, and examine possible alternative explanations as to why the IOC cannot compel those who put on the Olympic Games to avoid the worst outcomes of the Games. Section 4 will draw together some conclusions from the other sections.
