ABSTRACT
Chapter 6 used a principal-agent approach to examine the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) regulation of the actors that put on the Olympic Games: the National Olympic Committee (NOC), the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG), and the host city. The chapter revealed that the IOC is making progress with regard to holding its agents to account for the worst outcomes of the Olympic Games, and that Agenda 2020 looks to strengthen this accountability. Yet, there are shortcomings – such as weak consequences for the agents. Principal-agent approaches tend to focus on the morally hazardous activities of the agent, and on methods with which the principal can incentivise the agent to perform the delegated task. Keeping with the concept of the principal-agent approach, this chapter examines the role of the principal – the IOC. As discussed in Chapter 6, although the IOC is progressively strengthening the mandate of the agents, it is possible that the IOC may be unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to hold the agents to account. This lack of action may be in the IOC’s self-interest, given the costs of monitoring and sanctioning agents. However, it is not in the public interest. This chapter then asks the question: who watches the watchman? When the IOC does not regulate its agents, how can it be held to account? Chapters 1 and 3 observed that the IOC is largely unaccountable to other actors. A significant reason for this is the large degree of independence that the IOC enjoys. However, the IOC has recognised that some of its activities need to be conducted in a more accountable manner. To that end, this chapter will examine existing accountability forums within the Olympic Movement, namely the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the IOC Ethics Commission, to examine how they might be involved in improving accountability for the conduct of the Olympic Games. Yet, given the problems faced by the IOC and the Olympic Games, these forums may not be enough. For that reason, this chapter will also turn its gaze away from the world of sport, and examine another international actor who has dealt with accountability shortcomings: the World Bank. The World Bank, and its Inspection Panel, is probably the most-discussed
institution in regards to accountability in global administrative law. This chapter will engage in a comparative approach between the IOC and the World Bank, asking: (1) how did the World Bank address concerns over its accountability? (2) what are the similarities and differences between the World Bank and IOC that might affect accountability? and (3) what lessons from the World Bank’s experience might be applicable to the IOC? This chapter will proceed over four parts. Section 1 will outline the comparative legal approach used. It will also set out how the Olympic Games are similar to World Bank infrastructure projects. Section 2 will carry out the comparative analysis of the accountability forums within the Olympic Movement, and those within the World Bank. Attention will also be paid to the history of the World Bank that led to the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP). Section 3 will examine how an inspection panel, similar to the WBIP, might work within the Olympic Movement, and what considerations would have to be taken into account. Section 4 will draw some conclusions.
