ABSTRACT
The capabilities of automated flight systems increased rapidly following the introduction of the electronic autopilot in the 1940s. In normal operations, the automated flight system of the modern airliner can now control nearly all functions required for flight. The effect of increased automation has been largely positive, greatly reducing errors due to pilot fatigue and allowing consistent precise navigation and performance. However, automation has given rise to new problems caused by faulty interactions between the pilot and the autoflight system (AFS). This class of problems has been variously termed lack of mode awareness (Javaux & De Keyser, 1998), mode confusion (Degani, Shafto, & Kirlik, 1999), and automation surprise (Wiener & Curry, 1980; Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997, Woods & Sarter, 2000; Burki-Cohen, 2010). In these cases, the flight crew expects the automation to command one behavior and is surprised when it commands another. Automation surprise may result from undetected failures in aircraft sensors or other systems. Automation surprise also may result from pilots having an inadequate or mistaken “mental model” of the machine’s behavior in the operational environment (Sarter & Woods, 1995). In addition, automation surprise may result from a problematic interface that does not provide adequate information about the status of the machine (Norman, 1990; Feary et al., 1998; Degani et al., 1999).
