ABSTRACT
As the previous chapters have shown, for at least the first decade of his reign Baldwin had to maintain his kingdom on a war footing. Command of the coast was key to its security, and so at the same time as he was pursuing a policy of capturing the towns along the littoral, one by one, he had to resist repeated Egyptian attempts to retake Jaffa, using Ascalon as a bridgehead. Baldwin was not completely successful in either his offensive or his defensive campaigns, but his achievements were remarkable in view of his chronic shortage of manpower. We have already seen some of the side effects of this, particularly the need for the support of the Italian fleets to capture the coastal towns. In the short term Baldwin was unable to prevent them from sacking and looting, even when a surrender agreement was in place; in the longer term he bought their assistance at the cost of valuable trading privileges in the captured ports. Raising an army to respond quickly to attacks by the kingdom’s enemies was equally or even more problematical. This chapter will look at how Baldwin I’s army was raised and maintained; at some of the men who commanded the royal forces; at the evidence for the development of an administration to assist in the government of the kingdom; and at Baldwin’s relations with the other crusader states.
