ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an account of Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) and its relation to sociological theory and empirical research. It attempts to pre-empt possible misconstruals by dealing with a number of standard objections that have been raised against OLP. The chapter intends to register some of the difficulties in the encounter between someone who is committed to theoretical sociological practices and one who wants to call these practices into question, proposing at the same time a stance some sociological agendas have preconceptions about. The thematic structure of the dialogue is as follows: Sociology and philosophy Ordinary Language Philosophy conceptual and empirical problems. Objections to OLP: language and reality empirical evidence and handling disagreement conservatism. Now, by OLP, finally we will be relieved to hear, primarily to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin and, by extension, to those who followed in their footsteps.
