ABSTRACT

This chapter concentrates on some less extreme versions of dispositional essentialism such as have been proposed by some authors, especially Brian Ellis, and in an even less extreme version, the author thinks, by Stephen Mumford. It presents Ellis's main lines of argument and then tries to see whether some of the difficulties raised by his account and the answers suggested by Mumford are satisfactory, especially as far as a dispositionalist account of laws is concerned. The chapter presents some arguments in favor of such a position than merely make some suggestions as to what seem to author the major difficulties which any kind of dispositionalism should be ready to face rather than essentialism. Dispositions have no longer been viewed as ethereal or occult powers that have a pre-scientific status, threats or ghostly forces in need of redemption, mere promissory notes, some lazy or inaccurate way of talking that no self-respecting scientist should ever use.