ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the extensions to authors' repertoire of concepts necessary to accomplish the task of presenting an adequate philosophy of physics. It summarizes some of the arguments that might be assembled to defend the dynamicist point of view. The action of a causal power can be seen to generate regularity, fit to be expressed in an exceptionless 'law', only in the artificial conditions contrived in experiments. Exceptions to a law might also be put down to variations in the conditions under which a causal power is supposed to act. The distribution of dispositions and powers in distinct clusters is centred on particulars as instances of kinds. The dispositions to be malleable, ductile, and to look yellow and so on are a distinctive cluster of dispositions, uniquely attributable to just one metal, 'gold'. J.-M. Monnoyer makes the point that the case of grounding psychological dispositions in occurrent neural states is only analogous to the case of physical dispositions.
