ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the policy developments in the area as they unfolded from early 1968 to the change of government in June 1970. The NATO context will be set out, followed by the immediate domestic defence policy context in the first two months of 1968. The chapter explores the Mediterranean region in early 1968, and then the NATO reactions to the apparent reorientation. It analyses the impact of the Czechoslovak crisis and reviews the gradual creation of operational concepts, strategies and political analyses by different elements of government for the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean was the stage on which the naval leadership regained its self-confidence and assertiveness in the theatre that was defence and inter-service politics. The personal chemistry between Healey and Le Fanu helped to oil the wheels of the new approach, and the strategy was used to justify retaining the Navy's amphibious capability, and to support the case for the return of an organic maritime fixed-wing capability.
