ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the key concepts discussed in the preceding chapters of this book. The book explores that the Elworthy's private secretary described the Royal Air Force (RAF) as being on the edge of a 'precipice'. It explores by June 1965 the naval leadership was opposed not just by the central Secretariat, Healey, the RAF and Army leaderships, but also by the Treasury and the Foreign Office. The book provides the stage on which the slow re-emergence of naval self-confidence could be played out. It describes the Foreign and Commonwealth Office found no vital British interests outside those of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served by the increased naval presence in the region. The book describes that the Navy's recovery from the cancellation of the carrier was slow and gradual, but was real nonetheless. It shows how internal arguments within the Admiralty Board were combined by contradictions in the naval case even in vital meetings.
