ABSTRACT
The United States (US) decision to undertake a military action in Iraq, not only
without Security Council authorization but also in defiance of overwhelming
opposition of the majority of the Security Council as well as its NATO allies,
was a turning point in terms of commitment of the world’s dominant power to the
normative underpinnings of international order regarding the use of force. The
most controversial issue has become the Bush administration’s conception of the
pre-emptive use of force as formulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of
2002. Admittedly, the concept of pre-emption has long been a contentious doctrine
in international law. However, the Bush administration’s articulation of the concept
has added a more divisive dimension to the debate. While in traditional international
law, the claim to pre-emptive use of force can be invoked where there is imminence
of an attack, the NSS argued for adjustment of the concept of the imminent attack to
‘the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’. It asserted that ‘[t]he greater
the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy’s attack’ (NSS 2002, 15). Likewise, President Bush’s
second term NSS, released on 16 March 2006, preserves ‘pre-emption’ as part of the
US national security strategy in countering terrorism and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). It reiterates that the US ‘does not rule out the use of
force before attacks occur’ grounding the right to do so on ‘long-standing principles
of self defense’ (NSS 2006, 23).
