ABSTRACT
After the Doha Agreement and as the administration of US President Barak Obama ended its diplomatic embargo on Damascus in 2009 and decided to engage with Syria, the 14 March camp tried to make itself relevant and ensure its continued US backing. A Syrian return to Lebanon, whichever form it might take, was very unlikely. Both Washington and Damascus had been positioning themselves for engagement ever since Obama’s election in November 2008. Apparently, the new US administration was following in the footsteps of the French by resuming dialogue with Syria and indicating its willingness to return a US ambassador to Damascus. The US had withdrawn its ambassador after Rafik al-Hariri’s assassination four years earlier. The Bush administration’s demand that Syria must abandon its support for Hizbullah and Hamas in order to start a full dialogue with the US was no more likely to work under Obama. But the US and Israel would seek a firm assurance that Syria would at least moderate its support for Hamas and Hizbullah before negotiating on the Golan Heights. The Syrians needed Hizbullah as leverage in their own ongoing talks with Israel, but Lebanon should be responsible for safeguarding its own interests. Washington also wanted to see Israel and Lebanon engaging directly in peace negotiations. Many analysts emphasized that ‘Syria will play a key role with respect to stability in the region and Israel’s security.’ The US seemed to be attempting ‘to yank Syria out of Iran’s orbit in return for lifting the Syrian Accountability Act, pushing Israel harder on returning the Golan Heights and guaranteeing that the international tribunal in The Hague would not harm Syria in any significant way’.1 But Asad would not break with Iran because he doubted Washington’s commitment to the Syrian regime’s long-term stability, which was the primary Syrian concern.
