ABSTRACT
From 1963 onwards French political perceptions began to change, rst and foremost as a result of de Gaulle’s failure to achieve a high-ranking status for his country in the international arena. De Gaulle had initially attempted to obtain grandeur for France by means of the ‘western option’ – acquiring a status that would rank France alongside the Anglo-Saxon powers – and afterwards by exploiting the EEC in a bid to expand France’s inuence. However when both these avenues proved ineffective, he was forced to choose between two alternative channels to achieve his aim: becoming the patron of third-world countries, for which purpose he utilised France’s moral and material assets, or attempting to establish a diplomatic alliance with the Soviets, strengthening the détente in Europe and making it possible to force the Americans out of the continent. Both these routes – principally the second – had ramications for France’s relations with Israel, as became clear during the crisis of May to June 1967.
