chapter
Introduction
Pages 10

This chapter aims to defend scientific realism against the Putnam-style objection that it incoherently requires a God's Eye point of view. It seeks to establish two points. First, scientific realism does not presuppose a God's Eye point of view. Second, even if scientific realism did presuppose a God's Eye point of view, this would provide no basis on which to object to scientific realism. It may immediately be conceded that it is impossible for us to remove ourselves from the human perspective and adopt a God's Eye point of view. The internalist's epistemic conception of truth is therefore a repudiation of the God's Eye point of view. For the internalist denies that truth may be conceived as independent of either observer or conceptual scheme, as required by the metaphysical realist's God's Eye view of truth. But such a hypothesis about the relation between science and reality makes no evident use of a God's Eye point of view.